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1INTRODUCTION
In June of 1980, the Supreme Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, by a 5 to 4 
majority, that living organisms could be patented.1 Although the Court suggested that the holding 
was required by the text of the federal patent subject matter statute, in reality neither statutory 
text nor legal precedent directly addressed the issue.  In fact, given the pioneering nature of the 
patent application at issue, a holding against patentability in the case would have been both 
easier to justify and significantly less controversial than the Court’s actual holding. Far from
simply applying clear law to facts, the Court in Chakrabarty adopted an aggressive method of 
interpretation in order to update a statute in conformity with changing technology. Although 
several Congressional debates about Chakrabarty have occurred in the nearly quarter-century 
since the decision, Chakrabarty was never overridden by Congress. 
In this article, I consider the Chakrabarty decision and Congress’ response to it in light of 
several contemporary views on statutory interpretation. I conclude that in science and 
technology-related cases in which delay could significantly hamper the advancement of the field, 
the Supreme Court should interpret federal statutes dynamically in response to a changing social 
context, but should also attempt to conform its interpretations to legislative preferences in order
to avoid a legislative override. 
This approach has been proposed and discussed in several articles by Professor William 
Eskridge. Eskridge has endorsed a theory of “dynamic statutory interpretation,” but has also 
posited that the Supreme Court often attempts to avoid legislative override by attempting to 
mirror legislative preferences.2 Eskridge suggests that such behavior by the Court is in many 
cases normatively desirable.3 Several writers have produced important alternatives to Eskridge’s 
model. Professor John Manning, an adherent of the textualist approach, argues that judges sh ould 
2focus only on the plain text of a statute, ignoring contemporary legislative preferences as well as
any information about the enacting legislature’s intent that might be gleaned from legislative 
history.4 Professor Einer Elhauge, by contrast, endorses dynamic statutory interpretation, but in a 
more limited form than Eskridge. Elhauge would permit such interpretation only when the Court 
is confident that an interpretive preference could be enacted by the current legislature, not simply 
when the legislature would not override the interpretation, as Eskridge suggests.5
Putting aside questions as to how the Court actually behaves, I argue that at least  in the 
narrow realm of technological development, Eskridge’s approach is the superior one. I suggest
that in cases such as Chakrabarty, in which the statutory text is itself ambiguous and the enacting 
legislature could not have conceived of the contemporary context, Manning’s theory provides 
insufficient guidance. I also argue that for the same class of cases, Elhauge’s approach 
excessively restricts the Court’s ability to advance the law by acting more quickly than Congress, 
which might otherwise take years to address an issue due to political wrangling or procedural 
roadblocks. This point is particularly significant in the patent field, where the rapid pace of 
technological and scientific change requires frequent statutory changes.
The strength of the approach I outline depends, however, on the responsiveness of 
Congress; if Congress is unable to override Supreme Court statutory interpretations of which it 
disapproves, then my approach would permit an unelected Court to enact its personal policy 
preferences into law. Analysis of this issue is problematic due to the complexity of the legislative 
process, which makes it difficult to interpret both legislative action, such as the initiation of 
hearings or a floor discussion, and legislative inaction, which might imply lack of interest in an
issue, but might also stem from interest group pressure or even simple inertia. Based on an 
analysis of the congressional response to Chakrabarty and on the research of Professor Eskridge,
3this article concludes, however, that in the patent law context, the approach described above is 
feasible and appropriate, providing the proper balance between significant interests in 
technological progress and important concerns about countermajoritarianism. 
In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court’s holding in Chakrabarty was the 
correct one. Part I of this article describes the Chakrabarty decision and the relevant legal 
precedent, demonstrating that despite the conservative tone of the opinion, the Court’s holding 
was a clear assertion of authority to use expansive statutory interpretation in order to update 
statutes in light of changing social circumstances. Part II details the slight Congressional 
response immediately following the decision and the more significant response following the 
Board of Patent Appeals’ broad interpretation of the decision in 1987. Part III explains Professor 
Eskridge’s theories of statutory interpretation and considers two important alternatives to his
approach. It also describes his findings, in light of questions posed in this article, as to Congress’ 
ability to respond to Supreme Court holdings. The article concludes that due to the importance of 
speed in many cases related to scientific advancement, the Supreme Court should be free to 
interpret statutes dynamically in such cases, while consciously attempting to avoid legislative 
override. 
PART I: THE COURT DECISION AND ITS AFTERMATH
1.1: The Supreme Court Decision
In 1972, a microbiologist working at General Electric (GE) named Ananda Chakrabarty 
filed a patent application based on his development of a bacterium capable of breaking down 
certain components of crude oil, an innovation that he suggested could be useful in cleaning up 
oil spills.6 Chakrabarty had developed the bacterium by transferring four plasmids (small circular 
DNA molecules), each with the ability to break down particular components of oil, into a 
4Pseudomonas bacterium, which prior to the transfer was incapable of degrading oil.7 He claimed 
patent rights on both the method of producing the bacterium and on the bacterium itself.8
The Supreme Court approved both patent rights. It characterized the issue in the case as a 
“narrow one of statutory interpretation,”9 requiring the Court to construe 35 U.S.C. § 101, the 
federal statute that defines patentable subject matter. That statute provides:
Whoever invests or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.
The Court focused on whether Chakrabarty’s bacterium constituted “manufacture” or 
“composition of matter” within the meaning of the statute, and noted that “[i]n choosing such 
expansive terms…modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the 
patent laws would be given wide scope.”10 The Court considered whether Chakrabarty’s 
organism failed the “product of nature” test, a well-established doctrine that prohibited the 
patenting of newly discovered but unaltered natural products. In American Fruit Growers v. 
Brogdex in1931, the Supreme Court had reinforced this doctrine, holding that an orange, the rind 
of which had been treated with borax, could not be patented, because “addition of borax to the 
rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an article for use which possesses a 
new or distinctive form, quality or property.”11 The Chakrabarty Court rejected the view that 
Charkabarty’s organism was simply a product of nature, however, stating that his claim was “not 
to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a non-naturally occurring manufacture or 
composition of matter – a product of human ingenuity….”12
The government argued that Congress had not intended living things to be included 
within the scope of §101. It claimed that the enactment of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which 
provided for patent protection for certain asexually reproduced plants, and the enactment of the 
51970 Plant Variety Protection Act, which provided the same protection for certain sexually 
reproduced plants but specifically excluded bacteria, clearly indicated that Congress believed     
§ 101 not to encompass living things – if § 101 had encompassed living things, the government 
argued, neither the 1930 nor the 1970 Act would have been necessary.13
The Court dismissed this argument. It stated that plants were thought by Congress to fall 
outside of the scope of §101 not because they were alive, but rather because they were 
considered “products of nature,” which were non-patentable, and because they were considered 
not amenable to the “written description” requirement of patent law under 35 U.S.C. § 112.14
The first Patent Act addressed these concerns, the Court said, and the second Act was simply 
passed to include sexually reproducing plants, whose utility for identical reproduction was not 
recognized in 1930, but had become clear by 1970.15
The Court’s opinion in Chakrabarty thus appears to be a straightforward application of 
statutory interpretation techniques, seemingly uncontroversial. The more radical character of the 
Court’s decision in Chakrabarty begins to emerge, however, through a consideration of the 
central disagreement between the majority and the dissent in the case.
This disagreement centered on the government’s claim that living things should not be 
considered patentable subject matter unless Congress indicated explicitly that such patent 
protection was authorized. Congress, the government argued in its brief, “is best able to resolve 
the complex social, economic, and scientific questions frequently involved in [decisions 
extending the scope of patent law], and, if an extension is to be made, to tailor the statute to 
achieve precisely the desired ends.”16 This claim appeared to be on strong ground, particularly 
because only two years earlier, the Court in Parker v. Flook had stated explicitly that “we must 
6proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by 
Congress,”17 and had quoted from a 1972 opinion in Deepsouth Packing by Justice White: 
[W]e should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying our prior 
cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument for expansion of 
privilege is based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory 
language. We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before 
approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the 
beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts 
had previously thought.18
In Chakrabarty, however, the Court was not amenable to such a claim. Although it was 
clearly the Congress’s role to define patentable subject matter, the Court stated, it was entirely 
within the province of the judiciary to interpret Congress’s intention once in written form, and 
there was no ambiguity in §101 as to the patentability of living organisms.19 The fact that the 
subject matter provision in § 101 did not explicitly include living organisms was unimportant, 
because “[b]road general language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional objectives 
require broad terms.”20 Unlike in Flook, the Court was untroubled by the possibility that 
Congress had not foreseen a particular extension of patentable subject matter, and declared the 
government’s narrow understanding of §101 to be in tension with the very purposes of patent 
law: “the inventions most benefiting mankind are those that ‘push back the frontiers of 
chemistry, physics, and the like’…. Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 
precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable.”21
The Court portrayed its holding as a restrained one, meant to avoid treading on the 
province of Congress. In response to claims in both the government’s brief and an amicus brief 
that the patenting of living organisms posed significant ethical, social, and political concerns,22
the Court declared that the judiciary was without power to consider such issues: 
The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles. … [But] we are without 
competence to entertain these arguments …. The choice we are urged to make is 
7a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process after the kind 
of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide and 
courts cannot. That process involves the balancing of competing values and 
interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected 
representatives. Whatever their validity, the contentions now pressed on us 
should be addressed to the political branches of the Government, the Congress 
and the Executive, and not to the courts.23
In light of its dicta in Flook, statutory language that was far from clear, and the 
controversial nature of the issue in the case, the Court’s tone of modest restraint was curious, as 
Judge Brennan in dissent was quick to point out. Precisely because of the legislative nature of the 
issues involved, the dissent argued, “we must be careful to extend patent protection no further 
than Congress has provided.”24 The dissent disagreed with the majority’s construction of the 
plant patent acts, arguing that they indicated a congressional understanding that living things 
were not patentable, or at least “are signs of legislative attention to the problems of patenting 
living organisms” without an “affirmative indication of congressional intent that bacteria be 
patentable.”25 Even if there were no indication on the issue from Congress, however, “the courts
should leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into 
areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not available,”26 the dissent 
argued.
Thus, the dispute between the majority and dissent in Chakrabarty was not simply about 
whether § 101 was meant by Congress to include living organisms; more significantly, it 
concerned the proper roles of the Court and of Congress in advancing the law. The majority’s 
opinion suggested that even if Congress had not intended § 101 to include living organisms, the 
statute’s ambiguity allowed the Court to accommodate changing technology by interpreting it 
that way, after which Congress could consider the relevant social issues and overturn the court’s 
ruling if necessary. In the dissent’s view, however, the ambiguity of the statute precluded an 
8expansion of the law; the Court’s proper role was necessarily a conservative one. The dissent felt 
that only Congress, in its representative capacity and after careful consideration of the 
complicated issues involved, could act to adapt the law to changing times. 
Of course, the majority did not explicitly enunciate a progressive vision, instead 
portraying its decision as one mandated by the existing law. As described below, however, this 
conservative presentation of the decision is belied by the relevant precedent and lower court 
opinions in the case. In fact, the Court was basically unfettered in deciding the issue – at the very 
least, the precedent was ambiguous, and the Court could easily have taken the more conservative 
path of holding for the government, allowing Congress to include living organisms within patent 
protection if it chose to do so. Instead, the Court in Chakrabarty positioned itself as an active 
player in the advancement of science through the law, pushing the borders of patent law to the 
extent that the statutory language would allow, and leaving Congress to override its decision if it
felt that the Court had interpreted the statute incorrectly. 
1.2: Legal Precedent and Lower Court Opinions 
Before the late 1970s, neither the patent office nor the courts had taken any clear position 
as to the patentability of living organisms. As the Patent Commissioner noted in his brief in 
Chakrabarty, however, “it was the general understanding … that legislation was needed if patent 
protection was to be extended to microorganisms,” and various commentators and organizations, 
including the Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Law Section of the American Bar Association, 
had favored legislation to expand patent protection to microorganisms, suggesting that such 
protection did not already exist.27
 While some live matter – such as eggs, yeast, plant seeds, and bacterial spores – had 
been patented,28 patent applications on microorganisms were uniformly rejected, and certain 
9courts’ dicta hinted that they might be per se unpatentable.29 In most cases that raised the issue of 
patentability of living organisms, however, courts generally avoided addressing the issue directly 
and instead dismissed the applications on other grounds.30 In 1948 in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., for example, the Supreme Court considered a patent application for a 
substance capable of fixing nitrogen in legumes that was made up of six strains of bacteria.31
Previous attempts at combining bacterial strains for this purpose had failed due to the inhibitive 
effects of each strain on the others, but the Funk Brothers applicant had developed a particular 
combination of bacteria to avoid this problem.32 The Court did not consider the issue of whether 
bacteria were unpatentable per se, holding instead that because “[e]ach of the species of root-
nodule bacteria contained in the package infects the same group of leguminous plants which it 
always infected,” the invention was a product of nature and thus unpatentable.33  Similarly, in the 
1975 In re Merat decision, the CCPA faced a patent application for a process of producing 
“dwarf” hens, which could be mated with “normal” roosters to produce “normal” heavy meat 
fowl (using less chicken feed than normally required).34 The application included a patent claim 
on the chickens produced by the method themselves.35 The court found the patent specification 
requirements of 35 U.S.C. §112 unsatisfied in the case, thus avoiding any consideration of the 
implications of permitting a patent on a chicken.36
Two cases squarely raising the issue of whether living organisms could be patented made 
their way through the federal courts at approximately the same time. In 1974, the Upjohn 
Research Laboratory filed an application for a patent on the microorganism Streptomyces 
vellosus, developed to produce the antibiotic lincomycin, in the name of Upjohn scientist 
Malcolm E. Bergy.37 Patent applications on both the Bergy and Chakrabarty organisms were 
rejected by the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the rejections were affirmed on appeal 
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by the Board of Appeals of the PTO (Board).38 The two cases eventually arrived at the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), which at the time was the highest patent court below the 
Supreme Court.39
In Chakrabarty’s case, the patent examiner who initially considered the patent application 
permitted the process patent but rejected the application for a patent on the bacterium itself, 
stating that the patent was disallowed first, as a “product of nature” and second, because living 
things are not patentable under § 101.40 On appeal, the Board reversed the examiner on the first 
holding, finding that the bacterium in the application was not naturally occurring and thus not a 
“product of nature.”41 The Board upheld the second stated ground for decision, however, finding 
that Congress did not intend to include living organisms within the scope of § 101.42
The Upjohn microorganism patent application was also rejected by the patent examiner, 
in that case on the sole ground that it was unpatentable as a “product of nature.”43 The Board
seemed to disregard the examiner’s rationale for rejection, however, and again based its own 
rejection of the application on the fact that the microorganism was living and thus unpatentable 
under § 101.44 It stated that it had “extensively researched prior court decisions for guidance” as 
to whether living things could be patented, but “other than possibly non-controlling dicta,” could 
not find any case on point.45 It went on to find, however, that “only those categories of subject 
matter specifically enumerated in the statute are patentable and a living organism does not fall 
within the scope of any of those categories listed,” and that allowing bacteria to be patented 
might lead to the patenting of much more complicated forms of life.46
 The Upjohn patent appeal was the first to reach the CCPA, which reversed in a 3-2 
decision.47 The court began by flatly rejecting the suggestion that the microorganism was a 
product of nature, finding the evidence “incontrovertible” that the microorganism was not found 
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in nature.48 As for the issue of whether living things could be patented, the court labeled it a 
question of first impression, and briefly reviewed potentially relevant precedent.49
The court first considered In re Mancy, a 1974 case in which it had addressed the 
patentability of a method of producing an antibiotic by aerobically cultivating a strain of 
Streptomyces birfurcus.50 In that case, the court overruled a finding of obviousness51 by the 
lower court and compared it to a 1973 case, In re Kuehl,52 in which the non-obviousness 
requirement had been deemed satisfied.53 In rejecting any significant differences between the 
two cases, the Mancy court admitted that in Kuehl,
the novel zeolite used as a catalyst in the claimed hydrocarbon cracking processes 
was itself the subject of allowed claims in the application. Here appellants not 
only have no allowed claim to the novel strain of Streptomyces used in their 
process but would, we presume (without deciding), be unable to obtain such a 
claim because the strain, while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of 
record, is, as we understand it, a ‘product of nature.’54
This dictum had in the past been interpreted as indicating that living things were not patentable, 
since it suggested that the appellants would not have been permitted to claim a patent on the 
microorganism at issue. The CCPA rejected this reading, however, stating that “we now make it 
explicit that the thought underlying our presumption that Mancy could not have obtained a claim 
to the strain of microorganism he had described was simply that it lacked novelty,” and in any 
case “our dictum was ill-considered.”55
The CCPA also addressed dictum in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents 
Corp., 1931 case from the district court of Delaware.56 In that case, which involved a patent 
application for a fermentation process using bacteria, the court stated: 
Lastly, the defendant contends that the invention of the Weizmann patent is 
unpatentable since it is for the life process of a living organism. Were the patent 
for bacteria per se, a different situation would be presented. As before stated, the 
patent is not for bacteria per se. It is for a fermentation process employing 
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bacteria discovered by Weizmann under conditions set forth in the specification 
and claims.57
Again, this statement had been interpreted to indicate that living things were unpatentable, 
because the court in Guaranty Trust distinguished between permissible patenting of a process 
and impermissible patenting of the living organism itself. The CCPA rejected the relevance of 
this dictum out of hand, however, testily declaring it “a trite observation of minimal magnitude 
as precedent, dealing with a non-issue on which no opinion was expressed.”58 Finding the 
proffered precedent on the unpatentability of living organisms unconvincing, the Court
concluded that “the fact that microorganisms, as distinguished from chemical compounds, are 
alive is a distinction without legal significance and that disposes of the board's ground of 
rejection and the sole reason for refusal of a patent argued by the solicitor.”59
In Chakrabarty’s appeal to the CCPA, the Court referred back to its reasoning in Bergy
and reversed, in another 3-2 decision.60 In a strongly worded concurrence, Chief Judge Markey 
added that § 101 “is not ambiguous. No Congressional intent to limit patents to dead inventions 
lurks in the lacuna of the statute, and there is no grave or compelling circumstance requiring us 
to find it there.”61
In 1979, the Supreme Court granted the Commissioner of Patent and Trademark’s 
petition for certiorari in both Bergy and Chakrabarty, then vacated both judgments and remanded 
“for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook.”62 Flook, which had recently been decided, 
involved a patent application on a method for updating alarm limits (which are settings for 
temperature, pressure, and other variables and signal abnormal conditions) during catalytic 
conversion, in which the only new feature compared to previous methods was a particular 
mathematical formula.63 The Flook Court held that the method was not patentable because 
mathematical formulas may not be patented.64 Beyond the warning, quoted above, that “we must 
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proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by 
Congress,”65 and the related statement from Justice White’s opinion in Deepsouth Packing,66 the 
relevance of the Court’s decision in Flook to the facts of Chakrabarty and Bergy remain unclear. 
It is thus likely that the Court was referring the CCPA to these cautionary notes that urged a 
conservative reading of §101 in vacating and remanding the Chakrabarty and Bergy decisions. 
On remand, the CCPA wrote a joint decision for both cases, affirming its previous 
rulings.67 The court reviewed the facts and holding of Flook in detail, and despite the implication 
of the Supreme Court’s remand, found the case to be irrelevant, concluding, “[t]he only thing we 
see in common in these appeals and in Flook is that they all involve § 101.”68  The CCPA 
rejected the claim that the Court’s remand was based on Flook’s cautionary language, stating: 
We are not faced with a litigant urging upon us a construction of § 101 which is 
at odds with established precedent. Rather, we deal with a case of first 
impression. Not having been asked to make a change in existing law or to 
overrule or modify any case or to expand any right given by Congress, we need 
in this case no signal from that body. 69
After reviewing the reasons for its previous holdings and further explicating those rationales, the 
CCPA found both GE’s and Upjohn’s organisms to be patentable.70 The patent office again 
appealed the ruling and the Supreme Court granted certiorari,71 but the Upjohn lawyers withdrew 
their application for a product patent on their antibiotic-producing microorganism before the 
Court heard oral argument.72 Thus, the Bergy appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court as 
moot in 1980,73 and the Court announced its holding only as to Chakrabarty’s claim, affirming 
the ruling of the CCPA.74
The legal precedent and the lower court opinions in Chakrabarty provide a revealing 
glimpse of the legal case for patentability of living organisms at the time of the decision, and 
demonstrate the inaccuracy of the Court’s portrayal of its holding as one clearly mandated by 
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law. Before the Chakrabarty case, no court had stated that living organisms were patentable, and 
conventional wisdom within the bar as well as somewhat ambiguous court dicta suggested the 
opposite. The Supreme Court had only two years earlier in Flook cautioned against expanding 
the boundaries of patent law without clear congressional authorization, and the Court’s remand 
of the Bergy and Chakrabarty cases in 1979 with a direction to consider Flook suggests that the 
Court was considering just such a problem in those cases. The Court in Chakrabarty was faced 
with an issue of first impression, ambiguous statutory language, and an at least arguable claim 
(based on the two Plant Acts) that Congress did not intend living things to be patentable. The 
Court could have easily crafted an opinion holding against Chakrabarty, thus avoiding the 
significant controversy – which certainly must have been anticipated by the Court – that 
followed the decision. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chakrabarty was therefore far from a 
basic exercise in statutory interpretation; it was a conscious assertion of Court authority to 
advance the law with changing times. 
1.3: The Public Response
The controversial nature of the Court’s holding in Chakrabarty is confirmed by the 
media reports and legal press about the decision, which describe a flurry of public praise and 
criticism of the Court following Chakrabarty. These accounts also indicate a public recognition 
that both the majority and dissenting opinions in Chakrabarty contained a call for a 
Congressional response. Media reports of the time suggest an expectation that such a legislative 
response might soon be forthcoming. 
In a June 17, 1980 article reporting the decision, Linda Greenhouse of the New York 
Times wrote that “the opinion was hailed and denounced in the sweeping language that has 
characterized much of the debate since the Court agreed last October to decide the issue,” and 
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quoted the People’s Business Commission, a non-profit organization that had filed an amicus 
brief in the case, as stating that “[t]he Brave New World that Aldous Huxley warned of is now 
here.”75 The article also quoted Genentech, Inc., a genetic engineering company that had also 
filed an amicus brief, proclaiming that “[t]he Court has assured this country’s technological 
future.”76 The same day, the Washington Post reported that the decision was “one of the most 
controversial of the past decade.”77
Media reports following the opinion noted the bold nature of the Court’s holding. In a 
1984 article about the Supreme Court’s most recent opinions related to new technology, Fred 
Barbash of the Washington Post wrote of the assertiveness of the Chakrabarty Court’s vision of 
its role with respect to Congress. The article described the decision as a sign of the Court’s new 
willingness to meet the demands of science by expanding legal protection, even absent a specific 
Congressional mandate: 
Slowly and reluctantly, the justices are beginning to confront novel 
legal questions arising from the rush of high technology. And their most 
recent opinions indicate that they have no intention of standing in the way 
of this rush without explicit instructions from Congress. It is not the place 
of the federal judiciary to put the brakes on these developments, the court 
is saying, whether confronted with demands that it save the entertainment 
industry, as in the Sony case, or the world, as in [Chakrabarty].78
In articles both favorable to and opposed to the Court’s ruling in Chakrabarty, press and 
legal writers recognized the importance of Congress’s next move in determining the decision’s 
ultimate legacy. In the Christian Science Monitor, Robert Cowen wrote shortly after 
Chakrabarty that the holding left the real decision as to the patentability of living organisms to 
“society as a whole,” via the mouthpiece of Congress:79
In ruling that a "man-made" microbe is patentable, the US Supreme Court 
has resolved a narrow legal question and issued an awesome challenge. The 
people of the United States, through their elected representatives and legislative 
bodies, must decide the extent to which they believe humans should seek to 
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manipulate organic life at its fundamental level and under what restraints this 
should be done. The courts cannot make that decision for them.80
In a case note on the decision, the Harvard Law Review praised the Court’s willingness to take 
an assertive stand in broadening the law to accommodate new technologies, but noted that 
Congress had much work to do in the wake of the decision: 
Whether microorganisms should be patentable is a policy judgment that 
must be considered in light of the efficacy and purpose of the patent system itself. 
Because even the important patent issues arising in connection with 
microbiological research are ancillary to far broader scientific, social, and ethical 
issues, they should await comprehensive congressional review of microbiological 
and genetic research.81
Media reports of the time expressed the general sense that Chakrabarty “[left] open more 
questions than it answer[ed],” and that the Court’s decision was simply a first step in an area that 
Congress would ultimately mold through detailed legislation.82
1.4: After Chakrabarty
At the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, 114 patents applications 
involving new life forms were pending in the PTO, and new applications were coming in every 
day.83 Following the decision, the PTO began to grant applications on microorganisms such as 
Chakrabarty’s, although these grants were delayed for several months due to processing 
difficulties.84 It remained unclear whether animals could be patented, however, and the PTO 
stated no position on this matter for several years.
The issue was finally resolved in 1987, when Ex Parte Allen came before the Board.85
The case involved a patent application for polyploid oysters (oysters with three sets of 
chromosomes rather than two), which were sterile and grew to be larger than ordinary oysters, an 
appealing trait for commercial use.86 The patent examiner rejected the application because the 
oysters were living organisms, citing In re Merat,87 and the Board reversed this finding, stating 
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that Diamond v. Chakrabarty had held decisively that living organisms were patentable.88 In 
broad language, the Board declared that “the issue, in our view, in determining whether the 
claimed subject matter is patentable under § 101 is simply whether the subject matter is made by 
man.”89
The Board’s decision in Ex Parte Allen forced the PTO to change its policy, and soon 
after the holding, in April 1987, it released an announcement stating explicitly that multi-cellular 
organisms, including animals, were now patentable subject matter.90 In the announcement, the 
PTO noted that humans were excluded from this policy based on a Constitutional prohibition –
presumably under the Thirteenth Amendment’s slavery provision.91 The announcement appeared 
in the Official Gazette of the Patent Office: 
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally occurring 
non- human multi-cellular living organisms, including animals, to be patentable 
subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . . A claim directed to or 
including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be patentable 
subject matter within 35 U.S.C. § 101. The grant of a limited, but exclusive 
property right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution.92
Based on the new policy, the United States became the first country in the world to permit the 
patenting of animals.93 Unsurprisingly, the change was met with severe disapproval by some 
groups, and a coalition of animal rights and public policy groups formed almost immediately to 
block the change.94
On April 12, 1988, the first patent on a living multi-cellular organism was issued to 
Harvard University for the “Harvard mouse,” a mouse genetically engineered to develop a type 
of cancer useful as a model for human breast cancer.95 Several law suits challenging the action 
were filed, including Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg,96 a suit by animal husbandry groups, 
animal rights groups, and farmers claiming that the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks 
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had failed to comply with various requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in 
promulgating the new animal patent policy. The Federal Circuit dismissed the suit for lack of 
standing.97
After granting a patent on the Harvard mouse, the PTO did not approve any further 
animal patents for nearly five years. 98 The agency did not offer an explanation for this unofficial 
moratorium, but as a New York Times reporter put it, the agency “apparently got cold feet” in 
response to the controversy surrounding the Harvard mouse.99 In 1992, the PTO resumed 
issuance of such patents, authorizing three patents on mice that, like the Harvard mouse, were 
genetically engineered to provide models for human disease.100 Scores of animal patent
approvals followed.101 The rush of animal patenting in the early 1990’s raised the public profile 
of the issue, and Congress, which had first paid surprisingly little attention to Chakrabarty, 
began to take notice. 
PART II: THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
As described in Part I, the public expected that after the Chakrabarty decision, Congress 
would evaluate the permissibility of patenting living organisms. Both the majority and dissent in 
the case suggested that Congress should consider the issue; the majority declared that the policy 
repercussions of its decision were “a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative 
process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can provide 
and courts cannot,”102 and the dissent argued that “the courts should leave to Congress the 
decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege.”103 Media reports of the time noted 
the possibility of a congressional response, and commentators suggested that the Chakrabarty 
Court had “issued an awesome challenge” to the legislature.104
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The obvious question, then, is whether Congress did respond, and if so, what form did the 
response take? In this section, I give detailed consideration to the congressional action (or lack
thereof) related to the patentability of living organisms that followed the Chakrabarty decision. 
2.1: In the Wake of Chakrabarty
A week after the Chakrabarty decision, a meeting sponsored in part by the House 
Committee on Science and Technology was organized in Washington to discuss the significance 
of the decision.105 Patent lawyers, scientists, and congressmen all voiced their views at the 
meeting. Representative George Brown, a Democrat from California and the chairman of the 
House Science, Research, and Technology Subcommittee, cautioned that many members of the 
public had “genuine and deeply felt” apprehensions about the type of research Chakrabarty 
would encourage.106 Jonathan King, a professor of biology at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, argued that Congress should pass legislation explicitly prohibiting the patenting of 
living organisms.107  Representative Robert Drinan, a Democrat from Massachusetts, disagreed, 
arguing that Congress should wait and learn more about the technology before it acted, adding 
“[w]e make enough mistakes on matters we think we understand.”108
While the courts and many pundits seem to have expected a legislative evaluation of 
Chakrabarty to follow the decision, congressional observers suggested that Congress was 
unlikely to act in the near future.  A week after the decision, U.S. News & World Report noted 
that although the Chakrabarty Court “left the door open for Congress to amend the laws and set 
regulatory policy on the new research technology … congressional sources indicate that no 
changes in the law to upset the Supreme Court ruling are imminent.”109 Similarly, Chemical
Week reported that while “[t]he high court left open the door to some form of ban on patents for 
20
living organisms … Congressional observers … consider remote any move by Congress to 
change the patent law in this direction.”110
These predictions proved to be accurate – no noteworthy reports, debates, or legislation 
related to Chakrabarty emerged from Congress in the first seven years following the decision. 
This lack of congressional interest was notable considering the public controversy surrounding 
the decision and the reference to important policy implications of the holding in the amicus 
briefs and majority and dissenting opinions in the case. Despite this apparent need for legislative 
attention, it was only after the Board interpreted Chakrabarty to permit animal patenting in Ex 
Parte Allen that significant legislative interest in the decision emerged.
2.2: After Ex Parte Allen
Just as Chakrabarty had, Ex Parte Allen and the PTO’s subsequent announcement that it 
would approve animal patents let loose a storm of protest. Religious leaders and animal-welfare 
groups argued that patenting animals was unethical and would damage humanity’s relationship 
with nature, while farmers’ organizations worried that patents for superior breeds of animals 
resulting from genetic engineering would be owned and controlled by a few large companies.111
As a result, several congressmen adopted the Chakrabarty issue as a central political cause .
2.2.1: An Early Bill and the House Subcommittee Hearings
In May of 1987, just one month after the Board ’ decision in Ex Parte Allen and almost a 
year before the patenting of the Harvard mouse, Senator Mark Hatfield, a Republican from 
Oregon, proposed an amendment to a supplementary appropriations bill, prohibiting the use of 
appropriated funds for the patenting of genetically modified animals.112 The amendment, which 
would in essence prevent the PTO from considering or granting patent applications for animals 
until 1988, was adopted by the Senate without debate.113 Perhaps hoping that compromise would 
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ease political tensions, the PTO voluntarily agreed not to patent any animals through fiscal year 
1987 before the amendment could be considered in the House of Representatives.114
While the appropriations amendment was still pending in June, Representative Robert 
Kastenmeier, a Democrat from Wisconsin, initiated a set of hearings on the subject through the 
House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice (CCLAJ) 
within the Committee on the Judiciary. Kastenmeier announced that the purpose of the hearings, 
which were entitled “Patents and the Constitution: Transgenic Animals,” was “to assess the 
myriad of questions which arise from decisions to issue patents to genetically altered plants and 
animals,”115 including “moral and philosophical questions.”116 The hearings spanned four days 
and produced a 931-page record.117  Over thirty witnesses, including patent lawyers, law and 
biology professors, religious leaders, bioethics experts, anti-genetic engineering activists, 
biotechnology company representatives, and farmers’ advocates gave testimony at the hearings, 
and discussed both legal and policy considerations relevant to the patenting of animals.118
At the hearings, Kastenmeier expressed a lack of confidence in both the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chakrabarty and the Board of Appeal’s holding in Allen, as well as in the Patent and 
Trademark Commissioner’s ability to interpret §101 appropriately. He explicitly questioned the 
authority of the Chakrabarty decision, finding it “troubling” that “we tend to interpret 
[Chakrabarty] as the law of the land,” despite the fact that “[i]t was not only a five to four 
decision, but two members of the majority are not even on the Court now.” Thus, “even though it 
remains the law, [the Chakrabarty ] view is not shared by everybody,” Kastenmeier stated.119 In 
response to a witness who hoped that Congress would overturn Chakrabarty, however, 
Kastenmeier was not supportive, stating clearly, “[a]s far as microorganisms is [sic] concerned, 
that is already a lost cause…. I do not think that Chakrabarty will be repealed judicially or 
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otherwise.”120 Kastenmeier suggested that Congress could have properly evaluated and perhaps 
reacted to the ruling in Chakrabarty if it had responded earlier, and that if Congress did not 
review the implications of the PTO announcement immediately, that opportunity might pass in 
the same way:
[W]hen it was a question of microorganisms in the Chakrabarty case, 
people sort of shrugged their shoulders. But as it has now ascended to mammals 
and vertebrates, more people are concerned about implications, and if somebody 
does not look at it now … then it may be too late. 
At least I would want to feel that we made a conscious decision in 1987… 
that we have not allowed policies to eventuate which we cannot cope with later 
on…. Speak now or forever hold your peace, so to speak; that is the position we 
are in.121
One of Kastenmeier’s primary concerns appeared to be patenting of human beings; although the 
PTO had announced its position that humans were unpatentable under the Constitution, 
Kastenmeier suggested that a future administration could change that view unless Congress 
enacted a ban on patenting of human beings into law.122
Other speakers at the hearing argued both for and against congressional legislation on 
animal patents. Dr. Tegtmayer, the Assistant Commissioner for Patents at the PTO, stated that 
while she commended the Chairman of the Subcommittee for holding the hearing, and believed 
that animal patentability “is a good area to have a dialogue in,” the PTO position “at the present 
time is that we do not see any particular need to address this issue with legislation.”123 Reid 
Adler, a patent attorney who argued for an expansive interpretation of § 101, disagreed, claiming 
that the PTO Commissioner was overly conservative, and had “a poor track record in supporting 
novel, frontier technologies.” He claimed that the Commissioner had refused to apply 
Chakrabarty appropriately until the Board forced it to, and recommended that “Congress require 
annual reports from the PTO on the Commissioner’s administrative determinations under §101 
of any types of subject matter that are excluded from patentability.”124 At the same time, other 
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witnesses argued vehemently that Congress should restrict the Patent Office’s ability to expand 
the category of patentable subject matter.125
The 1987 House Subcommittee hearings did not produce one clear policy proposal, but 
they provided a wealth of information about the competing claims and values involved in the
animal patent controversy, and demonstrated that Congress was willing to carefully address the 
policy issues surrounding Chakrabarty. In a sense, the hearings had bolstered the position of the
Chakrabarty majority; they appeared to be precisely the type of “investigation, examination, and 
study” that the Chakrabarty majority had left to Congress, suggesting that the legislature was 
uniquely capable in that role.126
In the seven years following the hearings, ten bills prohibiting or regulating animal 
patenting were proposed in the House or Senate, but none passed, and most never emerged from 
committee. New proposals ceased to emerge not long after the PTO resumed approving animal 
patent applications in 1992, and the issue seemed dead until quite recently, when the human 
cloning controversy revived the Chakrabarty issue, this time in relation to patenting of human 
beings. Although the proposed bills (described below) differed from one another in several
respects, the comments of the Representatives and Senators supporting them were quite 
strikingly similar. Most suggested that Congress had disregarded its obligation to make law in 
the area related to Chakrabarty, and many specifically denounced both the Supreme Court and 
the PTO for inappropriately co-opting the legislative role.
2.2.2: Proposals in the late 1980s
In August of 1987, Representative Charles Rose, a Democrat from North Carolina, 
proposed a bill to impose a two-year moratorium on the patenting of “animals altered through 
genetic engineering technology.”127 The CCLAJ Subcommittee rejected this legislation the 
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following year.128 In February of 1988, Senator Hatfield proposed an almost identical 
moratorium bill.129 Presenting the bill in the Senate, Hatfield contrasted the executive role of the 
Patent Office with the legislative role of the Congress:. 
[T]he Patent Office itself admits that it does not take ethical or moral 
considerations into account when assessing an application for a patent. It is, I 
believe, the responsibility of Congress to fully consider what kind of 
technological creativity we wish to encourage through the patenting process, and 
I believe the giant leap to animal patenting provides us with the specific example 
we need to conduct such a debate.130
In Hatfield’s view, Congress should consider “the ethical implications of the creation, and 
exclusive rights to, an animal never before existing in nature.”131 He cautioned that he did not 
wish to halt genetic engineering, “a revolutionary science that may produce results nothing short 
of miraculous,” but only to provide time for Congress to fulfill its duty by carefully considering 
the issues involved.132 Hatfield’s bill was referred to the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, 
Copyrights and Trademarks, where it failed.133
In June of 1988, three months after the patenting of the Harvard mouse, Representative 
Kastenmeier introduced a bill proposing a different response to the PTO’s animal patenting 
announcement. Most relevantly, the bill did not prohibit patenting of animals, but declared that 
human beings were not patentable subject matter and, to protect farmers’ interests, that a farmer 
would not be guilty of patent infringement based on reproducing, using, or selling patented 
transgenic farm animals (but prohibited the selling of germ cells, semen, or embryos of such 
animals).134 On the floor of the House, Kastenmeier stated that the bill represented the 
conclusion of the extensive hearings held by the CCLAJ Subcommittee and run by him in 1987, 
and that it provided a better solution than the various moratorium bills suggested by his 
colleagues.135 Kastenmeier argued that no moratorium bill was likely to pass in Congress, and 
that regardless, a moratorium “does not answer the fundamental questions.”136 Representative 
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Carlos Moorhead, a Republican from California who also spoke in favor of the bill, argued that 
based on the information provided by the hearings, there was no evidence that research involving 
transgenic animals was dangerous or unethical, but that if at some point such research did 
become dangerous, “Congress has the ability to monitor research and development in this area 
and as soon as we detect abuse we can move in and remedy the situation.”137 Thus Moorhead, 
like Hatfield and Kastenmeier, believed that Congress had an obligation to actively monitor the
Chakrabarty issue. Another Congressman who rose to speak in favor of the bill, Representative 
Hamilton Fish of New York, a Republican, suggested that the public did not want a ban on 
patenting of genetically engineered animals, noting that a Public Perception Survey had found 
that “83 percent [of those polled] favor using genetically engineered organisms on a small scale 
for medical research” and “42 percent favored use on a large scale basis.”138
Kastenmeier’s bill passed in the House in September of 1988 and was referred to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, but the Senate never considered the measure.139 Kastenmeier 
introduced the bill again in 1989,140 stating “[i]t is my hope that given the extensive work done 
on this issue by the House that the Senate will turn to [it] early this Congress.”141 The bill was 
referred to the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of 
Justice in March of 1989, and the Subcommittee held hearings on the subject in September, but 
the bill never emerged from the Subcommittee.142
At about the same time, Representative Benjamin Cardin, a Democrat from Maryland, 
proposed another bill imposing a 2-year moratorium on the granting of animal patents, with a 
new exception for “animals the commercialization of which is subject to a Federal regulatory 
review and approval process.”143 Cardin, like Senator Hatfield a year earlier, emphasized the 
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distinct roles of the PTO and Congress, and suggested that Congress had derogated from its 
obligation to decide significant policy issues: 
It is the Congress’ duty, not PTO’s, to determine whether living 
organisms, like plants and animals, are patentable. Congress saw the need for this 
type of active involvement [in enacting the plant patent acts]. With regard to the 
patenting of animals, however, it was the PTO, not Congress, that decided in 
1987 that nonhuman animals constituted patentable subject matter. The PTO 
stepped in to fill the void. But it is time for Congress to become more involved in 
the debate.144
Cardin’s declaration that it is “Congress’ duty” to decide whether living organisms are patentable 
implied a subtle criticism of the Supreme Court’s holding in Chakrabarty, which in essence 
decided this question without congressional  input. This implied rebuke was emphasized by 
Cardin’s proposal of a comprehensive review of the patent laws: “I believe we have reached the 
point at which we must examine whether our patent system is keeping up with technology,” he 
stated.145 In proposing to adapt the patent laws to changing technology, Cardin suggested that the 
Supreme Court’s attempt to do just that in Chakrabarty was an imposition on Congress’s proper 
jurisdiction. Cardin’s moratorium bill, like those that had preceded it, failed to emerge from 
House subcommittee.146
Three months later, in February of 1990, Senator Hatfield proposed another moratorium 
bill in the Senate, this time for a five-year span,147 declaring, “the patenting of animals blurs the 
distinction between man’s work and God’s work.”148 Like Cardin, Hatfield emphasized the 
obligation of Congress to make policy determinations, and his rebuke of the Supreme Court and 
the Patent Office was strongly worded. He argued that traditionally, living things were 
appropriately not considered to be patentable under the law because they were “in the public 
ownership.”149 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court had reversed that position in Chakrabarty, 
despite a plea by the dissent (which was in the right, Hatfield implied) to leave such issues to the 
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Congress.150 The patent office had then made things worse by “unilaterally extending the holding 
in Chakrabarty” to permit animal patenting.151 In Hatfield’s view, this “represents a vast, unique 
and deeply troubling usurpation of Congressional authority … [and] denies the public the 
traditional legislative process for the protection of their rights.”152 Thus, Hatfield declared 
blatantly that the courts and the PTO had encroached upon congressional authority: “My 
legislation to rescind this patent office decision simply maintains the status quo, by returning 
major patenting decisions to the correct and traditional forum, Congress.”153 Like his earlier 
proposal, Hatfield’s bill failed in committee.154
Just as those congressmen in favor of a moratorium on animal patenting persisted in 
proposing a new bill each year, Representative Kastenmeier continued to argue in favor of his 
alternative proposal allowing the patenting of living organisms. In September of 1990, 
Kastenmeier reintroduced his bill in almost identical form (except that the prohibition on sale by 
farmers of farm animal germ cells, sperm, eggs, and embryos was eliminated), as part of the 
larger Patent Competitiveness and Technological Innovation Act of 1990.155 The bill was 
referred to the House Judiciary Committee, which produced a report in October.156  The report 
stated that the bill would provide support for the basic holding in Ex Parte Allen, but made clear 
that the Committee viewed the PTO’s actions as inappropriately co-opting the legislative role: 
[The bill,] by statutorily clarifying that transgenic animals are patentable 
and that transgenic human beings are not presumes that the patent and trademark 
office did usurp Congressional prerogatives, but agrees with the substance of the 
PTO decision as to patentability of transgenic animals. …157
Although the Commissioner had announced his position that human beings could not be patented 
under the U.S. Constitution, the report stated that a statutory clarification on the subject was 
necessary because “the Commissioner is totally without authority to resolve constitutional 
issues,”158 and his statement “does not even detail the precise grounds for the position”; thus it 
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“must be read as raising the issue, and not resolving it.”159 The report echoed Hatfield’s and 
Cardin’s explicit criticisms of the PTO and more subtle criticisms of the Supreme Court, stating 
that the Patent Office “unilaterally and bureaucratically” decided to allow patenting of animals 
by “bootstrapping from the rather highly contested decision in the Chakrabarty case.”160 If the 
human patents issue would be subject to the same type of “administrative caprice” by the PTO as 
was the animal patents issue, the report declared, congressional action was clearly necessary.161
The report also pointedly noted its agreement with the Chakrabarty dissent’s view that “[t]he 
courts should leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend the patent privilege 
into areas where the common understanding has been that patents are not available.”162 The new 
version of Kastenmeier’s bill did not advance beyond the publishing of the report, and like its 
predecessor, failed in committee.163
2.2.3: The Last Gasp for Animal Patenting Legislation
In the early 1990s, three more bills were introduced in Congress proposing a moratorium 
on animal patenting. Senator Hatfield in 1991 and Representative Cardin in 1992 introduced 
identical five-year moratorium bills in the Senate and House, and in 1993, Senator Hatfield 
introduced a final two-year moratorium bill in the Senate which, in addition to an animal 
patenting moratorium, included a moratorium on patenting of “human tissues, fluids, cells, [and] 
genes or gene sequences.”164 All of the bills failed in committee, and since 1993, no new bills on 
animal patenting have been proposed. The lack of new bills was perhaps in part due to the fact 
that the Patent Office lifted its voluntary moratorium on the issuing of animal patents in 1992 –
in 1991, there were more than 140 patents on animals pending in the Patent Office,165 and as 
these patents began to be granted, it is likely that the fight became much harder to win.  
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In their comments introducing their legislation, Hatfield and Cardin repeated well-worn 
themes, arguing that “Congress must act now if it is ever going to have the opportunity to 
examine the effects genetically engineered animals will have upon our environment.”166 In 
introducing his 1993 bill, Hatfield again criticized Congress’ inaction, and suggested that the 
PTO’s cessation of its unofficial moratorium on animal patents a year earlier was the direct result 
of this passivity: “In my view, [the PTO ended the moratorium] because they can realistically 
wait no longer for ethical guidance from Congress.”167 Both Cardin and Hatfield also drew 
attention to lobbying activity surrounding the bills. After introducing his 1992 bill, 
Representative Cardin included in the record a list of fifteen animal rights and farming groups 
that supported his legislation.168 Senator Hatfield criticized the intense lobbying efforts of groups 
opposed to his 1993 legislation, claiming that the Association of Biotechnology Companies and 
the Industrial Biotechnology Association had used “highly questionable tactics” in lobbying 
against his bill.169 None of these appeals seemed to work – neither congressman’s legislation 
progressed beyond committee.
2.3: The Current Human Patentability Debate
In the late 1990’s, Congress appeared to lose interest in the implications of patenting 
living organisms, but the issue of human patentability has recently reappeared as part of the 
larger human cloning controversy. In June 2002, Senator Sam Brownback, a Republican from 
Kansas, proposed legislation prohibiting the patenting of “human organisms.”170 This bill was 
distinct from another bill proposed by Brownback specifically to ban human cloning, but debate 
on the patent bill was nonetheless dominated by discussions about the problems with cloning 
human embryos. In the Senate floor debate, Brownback declared that Congress must be wary of 
those “who are contending that the young human at various stages – an embryo – is not a person, 
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therefore is patentable; that a person can be patented because it is a piece of property.”171
Brownback argued that he was proposing the bill “to make it clear to the Patent Office, [to] the 
people of America, the people around the world, that you can’t patent a person at any stage or 
age of its development and growth.”172 He later added: “We all know this debate is really about 
the future of humanity.”173
Senator Hatch, a Republican from Utah, accused Brownback of planting a “red herring” 
by shifting the debate about the permissibility of human cloning to a bill on patenting,174 a 
charge that did not seem far-fetched in view of Brownback’s focus  on the ethics of human 
cloning itself rather than on patents during his floor speeches. “I am greatly concerned,” Hatch
stated, “that in filing this particular amendment, our opponents in this debate are resorting to 
tactics that will not result in the careful consideration that this important issue merits.”175 Hatch 
also suggested that the amendment was unnecessary, since the PTO already had a policy 
prohibiting patenting of humans. (Interestingly, the Patent Office had announced that it no longer 
based this policy on Thirteenth Amendment grounds, but rather on the fact that it had not
received guidance from Congress or the courts on the issue.176)  Hatch added that the patent issue 
should most properly be examined by the Judiciary Committee, and that “[w]e need to know 
what, if any, tensions exist between the Brownback Amendment and the Supreme Court’s 
holding in the famous Chakrabarty decision.”177 Brownback conceded that the Patent Office 
prohibited human patenting, but argued that the PTO policy was being challenged in court, and 
declared, “[w]hat I am providing by this amendment is clarity by the legislative body.”178 After 
significant debate on the issue, Brownback’s amendment never reached a vote in the Senate.179
In July of 2003, Representative David Weldon, a Republican from Florida, proposed an 
amendment to a House appropriations bill prohibiting funding for the issuing of patents on 
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claims “directed to or encompassing a human organism.”180 In comments about the amendment, 
Weldon has insisted that it is simply a restatement of the Patent Office’s position against 
patenting of human beings, rather than, as some lobbying organizations have claimed, an attempt 
to broaden the scope of the policy to prohibit patents on stem cell lines or procedures for creating 
human embryos.181  The House of Representatives approved Weldon’s amendment in the month 
that it was proposed,182 but the bill never proceeded further. 
2.4: The Congressional Perspective on Chakrabarty
Congressional discussion of Chakrabarty in the nearly quarter of a century since the 
holding has had a consistently negative tone, with a focus on the perceived aggressiveness of the 
Court. Congress never overturned the decision, however, nor did it significantly modify it.
Congress evinced a curious lack of interest immediately after the decision, which was followed 
by attempts by a small number of Congressmen at modifying the holding in the wake of the 
Board of Patent Appeals’ expansive interpretation of it. These Congressmen generally viewed 
Chakrabarty as a dangerous usurpation of the congressional role, and forcefully asserted 
Congress’ duty to legislate in the area, particularly where necessary to prevent other branches 
from filling the void. Ultimately, these efforts to pass legislation on the issue failed. As described 
below, this failure could have been due to a variety of factors, and does not necessarily indicate 
that Congress as a whole was indifferent to the issue or approved of the decision. The next 
section considers the significance of the congressional response to Chakrabarty in light of 
contemporary academic scholarship. 
PART III: DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE INTERACTION 
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE COURT
The Supreme Court acted aggressively in Chakrabarty, interpreting § 101 broadly, with 
little support from statutory language or legislative history. The Court justified this foray into an 
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area with potentially complex policy implications by suggesting that if Congress disapproved of 
the Court’s decision or wanted to alter it in some way, it could respond appropriately. Congress 
did not respond until seven years later, when Chakrabarty was interpreted by the Patent Office to 
apply to animals. Even then, each legislative bill proposed in Congress to modify or overturn the 
holding failed to pass. 
This history sheds some light on the relationship between the Supreme Court and 
Congress, but its import is not entirely clear. Did Congress respond to Chakrabarty as the Court 
expected or hoped it to? Was Congress’s inability to pass a bill modifying or overruling the 
Chakrabarty decision an indication that the Court’s interpretation of § 101 was “correct” in some 
sense? Recent academic literature concerning statutory interpretation and the interactions 
between the Supreme Court and Congress helps answer these questions. 
3.1: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation with an Eye to Congress
The Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation in Chakrabarty is consistent 
with a method proposed by Professor William Eskridge in his 1987 article, Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation,183 and expanded in his 1991 article, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions [hereinafter “Overriding”].184
In Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Eskridge criticizes the “originalist” model of 
statutory interpretation, and urges courts to update interpretations of statutes in conformity with
social changes. According to Eskridge, the originalist approach, which focuses on the original 
intent of the drafters of the statute, fails because the legislature cannot consider every issue that 
may come up in relation to the statute, and “[a]s society changes, adapts to the statute, and 
generates new variations of the problem which gave rise to the statute, the unanticipated gaps 
and ambiguities proliferate.”185 These gaps lead originalist judges to produce out-of-date and 
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counter-productive statutory interpretations that do  not do justice to the legislature’s interests in 
enacting the statute, Eskridge claims.186 Only through dynamic statutory interpretation can the 
judiciary properly advance the legislature’s vision and “contribute to the legitimacy of our 
government as a whole.”187
Eskridge envisions a continuum of cases. On one end of the continuum are cases that 
involve a recently drafted statute, a detailed statutory text , and a historical context indicating that 
the legislature deliberated on the relevant issue and decided it – for these cases, Eskridge says, 
the language of the text should control the result, because a textual reading is likely to accurately 
reflect both current social understandings and original legislative interests.188 On the other end of 
the continuum are cases involving an old statute with general or ambiguous language, a societal 
or legal context greatly transformed since the statute’s drafting, and little indication that the 
original drafters considered the relevant interpretive question – in those cases, Eskridge claims,
the judge should update the statute in accordance with the changed societal context, giving little 
heed to the original intentions of the drafters.189 Eskridge argues that the further a case falls 
along this continuum, the freer a judge should feel to interpret the statute aggressively and use
the “evolutive” context of the case to adapt the statute to a contemporary setting.190
Chakrabarty presents a case on the far end of Eskridge’s continuum. The statute in 
question, 35 U.S.C. § 101, was passed in 1952, almost thirty years before Chakrabarty, and its 
language was taken almost verbatim from a statute passed in 1793.191 The wording of §101 is
very general, and the language is ambiguous as to the permissibility of patenting living 
organisms. There is no indication that either the 1952 or 1793 Congress had considered the issue
of patenting life forms. Most importantly, the social context had changed significantly in the ten
years prior to the Chakrabarty decision: the development of recombinant DNA technology and 
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the increasingly clear potential of genetic engineering had raised the stakes enormously on the 
issue of patenting living organisms. Congress in 1952 could not have anticipated the issue that 
was in essence decided by the Chakrabarty Court: whether patent incentives should be used to 
encourage the development of the genetic engineering field. Thus, under Eskridge’s view, the
Chakrabarty Court should have felt no compulsion to stay true to either the statutory text of §101
or the drafting Congress’ original legislative intent.
In Overriding, Eskridge describes an exhaustive study he performed of Congressional 
responses to statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court (discussed in more detail below), and 
expands on his theory of statutory interpretation based on his findings. Eskridge describes a 
“sequential game” model of interaction between the institutions that create, interpret, and enforce 
statutes: 
The model posits that a dynamic game exists between the Court, the relevant 
congressional committees, Congress, and the President. In this game, ultimate 
statutory policy is set through a sequential process by which each player –
including the Court – tries to impose its policy preferences. The game is a 
dynamic one because each player is responsive to the preferences of other players 
and because the preferences of the players change as information is generated and 
distributed in the game.192
As part of this game, Eskridge suggests that the Supreme Court prefers not to be overridden by 
Congress, and thus intentionally interprets statutes as the current Congress would interpret them 
where it knows that Congress would otherwise override its judgments.193 Under this theory, the 
Court’s decisions should closely mirror the current legislature’s preferences, except in the 
marginal area in which Congress cannot or is unwilling to overturn a Court holding. Eskridge 
posits that this behavior is at least a partial explanation for the relative dearth of Congressional 
overrides of Supreme Court decisions.194  Because the Court is careful to interpret statutes so as 
not to be overridden by Congress, Congress tends to override Court interpretations only where 
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Congressional preferences have changed over time, where the Court misinterpreted
Congressional preferences, or where the Court actually invited a Congressional override for 
institutional reasons.195
In Eskridge’s view, this empirically observable behavior by the Court is often
normatively valuable – he suggests that such a strategy eliminates the need for Congress to 
constantly revisit and update statutes, thus improving legislative efficiency and advancing the 
legislature’s goals.196 Eskridge also claims, however, that an interpretive approach based strongly 
on current legislative intent may be too majoritarian at times, ignoring the preferences of 
underprivileged groups that lack political representation.197 Eskridge argues that the Court should 
sometimes adopt a deliberately countermajoritarian, normative approach, acting as the 
“conscience of the nation's pluralism by bringing attention to interests that go unrepresented in 
Washington and values that are overlooked.”198
3.2: Eskridge and the Chakrabarty Holding
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Chakrabarty conforms with the approach to statutory 
interpretation described by Eskridge in Dynamic Statutory Interpretation. Although it is less 
clear whether the Court explicitly attempted to avoid an override from Congress as described by 
Eskridge in Overriding, the Court’s opinion and the response of Congress to the decision is
consistent with this model. 
In dismissing the relevance of the cautionary language in Flook, the Court in 
Chakrabarty declared that it was the judiciary’s role to interpret statutes in conformity with 
changing technology, particularly in the area of patent law: 
Flook did not announce a new principle that inventions in areas not contemplated 
by Congress when the patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se. To read 
that concept into Flook would frustrate the purposes of the patent law. This Court 
frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the ‘particular 
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application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators.’ … This is especially true in 
the field of patent law.199
This language fits comfortably within the dynamic statutory interpretation model. T he 
Chakrabarty Court suggested that since advancing technologies continuously alter the legal 
scope and significance of patent law, courts must be free to modify their interpretations of
relevant statutes to remain consistent with the contemporary context. Just as Eskridge  suggests, 
the Court considered “not only what the legislation mean[t] abstractly … but also what it ought 
to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day society.”200
Of course, the Court in Chakrabarty did not explicitly adopt an aggressive interpretive
posture. Its statements that “Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given 
wide scope”201 and that “ Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely 
because such inventions are often unforeseeable”202 suggest that the holding was based on simple
statutory interpretation – if Congress deliberately drafted §101 expansively with the hope that the 
Court would adapt the statute to unforeseen technologies, the Court’s authorization of
Chakrabarty’s patent could be considered entirely consistent with the text. 
While this view has some merit, it cannot, however, transform the Chakrabarty holding
into a conservative exercise in basic statutory interpretation. The Court’s interpretation of §101 
as evincing a Congressional intention to allow expansion of the patent laws far beyond what was 
foreseen at the time was itself an assertive choice, conducive to the dynamic interpretive 
approach and not in any sense required by the text of the §101. This point is evident in light of
both legal precedent on the issue and the Court’s own previous statements, as described in Part I. 
Just two years earlier in Flook, the Court had rejected the view that section §101 permitted the 
Court to expand the scope of patent law whenever new technologies demanded it, noting that 
“we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly 
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unforeseen by Congress.”203 The Court in Flook stated explicitly that expansion of the patent 
privilege must be “based on more than mere inference from ambiguous statutory language,” and 
that a “clear and certain signal from Congress” would be required before approving a broader 
scope to patent protection than previously described by the courts.204 The statutory language was 
clearly ambiguous as to the permissibility of  patenting life, no “clear and certain signal” had 
emerged from Congress, and although legal precedent on the issue was not entirely clear-cut, 
courts had never permitted patents on living organisms in the past. Under the Court’s own 
formula in Flook, then, the appropriate response would have been to reject Chakrabarty’s 
application and allow Congress to address the issue. Instead, the Court reversed its position in 
Flook and permitted an unprecedented, highly controversial expansion of the patent privilege. 
This decision can be explained only as a quite pragmatic adoption of a dynamic interpretive 
approach.
Whether the Supreme Court considered the possibility of a Congressional override in 
coming to its decision in Chakrabarty, as Eskridge’s argument in Overriding would suggest, is 
impossible to say – such behavior can be researched only through large scale studies, as Eskridge
has done. Interestingly, despite all of the activity in Congress in opposition to the Chakrabarty 
holding over more than a decade, the decision has never been overridden by the legislature. This 
result is at least consistent with Eskridge’s thesis. 
3.3: Criticisms of Eskridge’s Approach
Statutory interpretation has enjoyed significant academic attention in recent years, and a 
number of theorists have proposed important alternatives to Eskridge’s approach. The 
Chakrabarty case provides an intriguing lens through which to consider some of these 
alternatives.  
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3.3.1: Manning and Textualism
Professor John Manning, a leading adherent of the textualist doctrine, suggests that to 
properly fulfill their roles as faithful agents of the legislature, judges should enforce only the 
plain meaning of a statute as written, even if this occasionally requires allowing absurd results.205
Manning argues against the use of legislative history or any other extra-statutory tool that might 
illuminate what Congress “really intended” as to a particular issue, suggesting that “the 
legislative process is simply too complex and too opaque to permit judges to get inside 
Congress's ‘mind.’”206 Any concept of genuine collective legislative intent distinct from that 
expressed in the statutory text is meaningless, Manning claims.207 Manning also argues that the 
use of legislative history allows Congress to unconstitutionally delegate its legislative power to 
the courts; textualism prevents such delegation, he suggests, by requiring Congress to fully 
elucidate the meaning of a statute in the text of the statute itself.208
One could argue that Chakrabarty was actually decided under the textualist rubric. Since 
§101 states that the inventor or discoverer of “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter … may obtain a patent therefore,” and provides no 
exception for living organisms, the Chakrabarty bacterium would seem to fit easily within the 
plain text of the statute. As discussed above, the Supreme Court described its holding in the case 
as an uncontroversial exercise of basic statutory interpretation. But if Chakrabarty was a passive 
textualist decision, why was the holding considered by the media to be an “awesome challenge” 
to Congress, and why did several members of Congress describe the decision on the house floor 
as an unwarranted judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives? 
The problem is that the legal precedent and conventional wisdom that had developed 
since the enactment of §101 strongly suggested that living organisms were unpatentable. Where 
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a solid legal position on an issue has built up over many decades and is supported by 
conventional wisdom within society, as in Chakrabarty, the Court’s holding in contravention of 
that position, even if consistent with the plain meaning of a statute, cannot reasonably be 
considered faithful to the spirit of textualist methodology. As Eskridge has noted, textualism 
“lacks a satisfactory theory of precedent” 209; in this sense, the doctrine seems descriptively 
incomplete. Chakrabarty was thus much more a dynamic than a textualist decision, and the 
Court took an active role in fostering scientific progress in the face of technology evolving too 
rapidly for Congress to keep up. 
On a broader level, textualism is unhelpful in resolving the central dilemma raised by 
cases such as Chakrabarty. The question of whether to consider legislative history to determine 
the enacting legislature’s collective “intent,” the main focus for Manning, is largely irrelevant in 
Chakrabarty, because there is no enacting legislative “intent” that could possibly be elucidated in 
that case. The enacting Congresses in 1793 and 1952 could not have foreseen or understood the 
issues raised in Chakrabarty, and trying to uncover their views on patenting of living organisms 
would therefore be pointless. The real question in the Chakrabarty context is how to proceed 
when social circumstances have changed so drastically since the enactment of a statute that both 
the actual text of a statute and extra-textual indicators as to Congress’ intentions are close to 
useless in deciding a contemporary controversy. As to this problem, Manning’s theory is not 
helpful. 
3.3.2: Elhauge and Preference-Estimating
Professor Einer Elhauge points out this problem with the textualist approach in his article, 
Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules [hereinafter “Preference-Estimating”].210 Elhauge 
argues that statutory interpretation involves two distinct concerns: (1) “How should courts divine 
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a statute’s meaning?”, and (2) “How should courts decide what to do when they cannot divine a 
statute’s meaning?”211 The first problem is the focus of textualism and several other theories of 
statutory interpretation, while the second problem has been largely neglected within academia, 
Elhauge argues. It is this second problem that makes the Chakrabarty case difficult. 
While Elhauge, like Eskridge, rejects the basic premises of textualism, he disagrees in 
important ways with Eskridge’s model, and suggests a third alternative for statutory 
interpretation. In Preference-Estimating, Elhauge suggests that where statutory ambiguity and 
changed circumstances leave a statute’s meaning as to a particular issue unclear, judges should 
not resort to policy judgments but should instead act as “honest agents for the political 
branches.”212 While this might seem difficult in the absence of any evidence of the enacting 
legislature’s actual intentions, Elhauge suggests that it can be achieved through the use of 
“preference-estimating default rules” in statutory interpretation – rules that would generally 
minimize political dissatisfaction with the interpretive result.213 Elhauge’s suggestion for a 
central default rule places his approach squarely between the theories of Eskridge and Manning:
I conclude that where there is ambiguity in statutory meaning, the enacting 
government's preferences would overall be maximized by a general default rule 
that dynamically tracks the enactable preferences of the current government –
where those preferences can be determined with relative reliability – rather than 
statically sticking with the enacting government's preferences.214
Elhauge suggests that although his model focuses on the preferences of the current legislature, it 
is in fact faithful to the preferences of the enacting legislature. The enacting legislature, he 
argues, would prefer to have power over all existing statutes during its time in office, including 
those enacted by previous legislatures, rather than having power only over those statutes it 
actually enacted, even if such power were to extend into the distant future.215
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Elhauge is careful to distinguish his theory from theories such as Eskridge’s, which 
encourage judges to update old statutes along with changing values and preferences in society at 
large. In Elhauge’s view, a judge may update a statute through statutory interpretation only 
where the change could actually be enacted into law by the current legislature, taking into 
account all of the political and procedural barriers involved in such an enterprise.216 Imposing 
such a limitation on dynamic statutory interpretation by a court, Elhauge argues, allows judges to 
act as agents “for the political forces that can command enough political agreement to enact 
statutes,” while not allowing judges to “take sides where political gridlock exists.”217 Such a 
system is helpful to the legislature, Elhauge suggests, in those situations where an enactable 
preference might not become law due to the simple costs of legislating, or might take more time 
to be enacted than the legislature would prefer:
[T]he whole point of using preference-estimating default rules is to minimize 
political dissatisfaction for issues too minor to provoke legislative action, or in the 
interim before the legislature acts, and to free the political process from the 
needless burden of making enactments it would probably make if time and 
political energy were not scarce.218
For a preference to be considered currently enactable so as to justify dynamic statutory 
interpretation by a court, it must be “memorialized in some relatively well-defined official 
political action, Elhauge states.”219 He suggests that where the current legislature amends or 
enacts a statute without altering an interpretation of a statute that has been brought to its 
attention, there is a good chance that the interpretation is enactable.220 He also argues that 
subsequent legislative history may in some cases provide a good indication that a preference is
currently enactable.221
Under Elhauge’s paradigm, the Court’s holding in Chakrabarty was incorrect. Since 
§101 was ambiguous as to the permissibility of patenting of living organisms and the social 
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context had changed greatly since enactment of the statute, Elhauge would focus on whether a 
law allowing patenting of living organisms would be currently enactable by the legislature. The 
answer in this case is almost certain: Congress in 1980 could not have enacted such a law. This is 
aptly demonstrated by the astonished reaction of both the press and the legislature to the Court’s 
holding, as discussed above. This fact would probably  have been clear to the Court at the time as 
well, based on the controversy that surrounded genetic engineering. Certainly, Elhauge’s 
requirement that the preference for allowing organism patenting be “memorialized in some 
relatively well-defined official political action” was not satisfied. 
It is important to distinguish Elhauge’s view from Eskridge’s – while Elhauge argues 
against dynamic statutory interpretation unless a political preference is actually enactable by the 
current legislature, Eskridge suggests that dynamic statutory interpretation is generally 
permissible at least as to political preferences that will not be overridden by the legislature.222
This division is critical, since dynamic statutory interpretation by the Court is likely to have the 
most significant effect precisely in those holdings permitted by Eskridge but forbidden by 
Elhauge – where the issue is not quite controversial enough for the legislature to reverse the 
court, but not politically harmless enough for the legislature itself to enact the preference into 
law, at least at the present time. Chakrabarty falls within this category.
I suggest that, in cases with implications for scientific and technological progress, 
Eskridge’s more permissive approach is the superior one. Such science and technology-related 
cases are generally characterized by important time constraints – a court’s decision to update a 
statute ten years before the legislature would have achieved the change (this was arguably the 
situation in Chakrabarty) can critically impact the pace of scientific innovation. In this context, 
Elhauge’s requirement that the court wait until the change could be enacted by the legislature 
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itself is inadequate, leaving the court almost as passive as a textualist approach would. A few 
months might be saved under this model, but likely little more. Elhauge’s model does not take 
advantage of the particular trait that makes courts such valuable partners to the legislature: the 
ability to make change quickly.
Both Eskridge and Elhauge present their theories as empirically correct and normatively 
preferable – both claim that the Court does and should act in the way they describe. I take no 
position as to the empirical question, but suggest that at least in the scientific arena, the Court 
should behave as Eskridge suggests.223
Elhauge’s objections to endorsing dynamic statutory interpretation wherever 
congressional override is unlikely are significant. He argues that although some judicial 
judgment is always required in the realm of statutory interpretation, allowing judges to judicially 
impose unenactable preferences undermines the country’s democratic institutions.224 Elhauge 
suggests that this type of statutory interpretation might in fact be constitutionally problematic, 
since it would permit the development of law outside the bounds of bicameralism and 
presentment.225
Elhauge himself admits,226 however, that deciding which political preferences are 
actually enactable is itself a difficult and imprecise enterprise, allowing room for judges to draw 
the fine lines and consider the policy issues that Elhauge would like them to ignore. Assuming, 
then, that judicial discretion is ultimately unavoidable, the complete legislative supremacy 
championed by Elhauge seems an impracticable goal, not significantly more likely to occur 
under his approach than under Eskridge’s. Elhauge’s approach would undeniably lead to some
higher degree of fealty to legislative preferences than Eskridge’s, but I suggest that because of 
the significant judicial discretion inherent in both models, the difference would be marginal and 
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too insignificant to sacrifice the valuable efficiency goals promoted by Eskridge’s approach, at 
least where time-sensitive scientific innovation is involved. Eskridge’s strategy would 
sufficiently guarantee legislative supremacy and would set a more optimal balance between 
society’s interests in preventing judicial policy-making and its interests in keeping the law up to 
date with technological progress. 
3.4: The Ability of Congress to Respond to Supreme Court Statutory Holdings
Of course, the view delineated above depends for its power on the proposition that 
Congress is generally vigilant in reviewing judicial interpretations of its statutes, at least by the 
Supreme Court. If Congress does not generally pay attention to Supreme Court interpretations 
and override those with which it disagrees, Eskridge’s theory would allow the Court to impose 
its own legal preferences on society with no restriction, in which case Elhauge’s method presents 
a better way to protect democratic institutions. As discussed in the next section, Professor 
Eskridge has contributed greatly to elucidating this important issue.
In Overriding, Eskridge argues that despite conventional wisdom suggesting that 
Congress is ignorant of Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes, Congress and 
congressional committees are actually “aware of the Court’s statutory decisions, devote 
significant efforts towards analyzing their policy implications, and override those decisions with 
a frequency heretofore unreported.”227
To test his theory, Eskridge performed a thorough empirical study on Supreme Court 
federal statutory decisions overridden, or at least considered and discussed, by Congress between 
1967 and 1991.228 Eskridge found that Congress considers and deliberates over a large 
proportion of Supreme Court statutory decisions, and overrides a small though not insignificant 
number of these: between 1975 and 1990, for example, each Congress overrode an average of 
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approximately twelve Supreme Court statutory decisions, and almost half of the Court’s statutory 
decisions per year since 1975 had been or were soon to be the focus of congressional hearings in 
1991, at the time Eskridge published the article.229 Based on this data, Eskridge concludes that 
“the Supreme Court’s statutory decisions are accessible to Congress,” and that “key staff 
members become aware of any significant Supreme Court decision affecting issues within their 
committee’s jurisdiction.”230  Eskridge also notes that when Congress decides to override a Court 
decision, it usually does so quickly – of the Supreme Court cases that were overridden, almost 
half were overridden within two years of the decision, two-thirds within five years, and three 
quarters within ten years.231
Eskridge also considered the nature of Supreme Court statutory decisions that were most
and least likely to be overridden by Congress. He found that cases dealing with criminal law, 
antitrust, civil rights, and bankruptcy were overridden at the highest rates.232 Patent law cases
(grouped together with copyright and trademark cases) were overridden at an intermediate rate as 
compared to other types of cases.233 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Eskridge found that the more 
fragmented or ideologically divided the Court had been in its holding, the more likely Congress 
was to overturn the decision: most of the holdings overridden by Congress were decided by a 4-
4, 5-4, or 6-3 Court, and three-fifths were ideologically divided in some way, usually with 
Justices Brennan and Marshall on one side and Justice Rehnquist on the other.234 (It is interesting 
to note that although Chakrabarty was a 5-4 decision, it did not divide neatly along traditional 
ideological lines – conservative justices Burger and Rehnquist were in the majority with Justices 
Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, and liberal justices Marshall and Brennan were joined by more 
centrist justices White and Powell.)
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Eskridge also considered who the “losing” groups were in the court cases that were most 
likely to be overridden by Congress. His findings indicate that federal, state, and local 
governments are significantly more likely to convince Congress to override an adverse Supreme 
Court decision than any other group, while religious groups, the poor, veterans, non-citizens, 
racial minorities, criminal defendants, the disabled, and women are among the groups least likely 
to achieve a congressional override.235
Congress is generally unable or unwilling to pass legislation where powerful interest 
groups are aligned on both sides of an issue. In the twenty-four years between 1967 and 1991, 
Eskridge says, there were “only a handful of overrides in which Congress acted against the 
strong opposition of an important interest group, and the overrides in those cases required a 
Herculean effort.”236 Eskridge notes an interesting corollary to this phenomenon: in the arena of 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation, the most controversial instances of judicial policymaking 
are generally least likely to be overridden by Congress, because in such cases there are generally
“strong interest group alignments on both sides of the issues, leaving the Court's decisions firmly 
intact.”237 For this reason, he observes, “the Court’s most dramatic policymaking decisions have
remained untouched by Congress.”238
Eskridge notes that such a phenomenon, if responsible for the relatively small number of 
congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations, would be troubling, as it 
would confirm the fear that the judiciary is writing its policy preferences permanently into 
law.239 He suggests, however, that the real explanation for this scarcity of congressional 
overrides may be that, as discussed above, the Court tends to interpret statutes as it believes the 
current Congress would interpret them, so as to intentionally avoid a congressional override.240
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Thus, Eskridge’s data generally support the view that Congress is vigilant in reviewing 
Supreme Court interpretations of federal statutes. His findings as to the power of interest groups
are significant, however, and suggest that in updating old statutes while avoiding Congressional 
overrides, the Court should be cognizant of those cases in which interest group gridlock leaves 
Congress unable rather than unwilling to override a Court decision. This context provide a 
particularly strong argument for Elhauge, since a Court willing to act in the absence of 
Congressional override in such cases would likely subvert the intentions of Congress, while a 
Court willing to create changes only if they could be enacted by the current legislature would 
not. The Court should thus avoid aggressive interpretation in such cases.241 With this caveat, 
however, Eskridge’s findings suggest that the model described above would not be characterized 
by judicial policymaking run amok, but would instead usefully balance majoritarian interests and 
efficient development of the law.
On the other hand, legislative inaction (the only signal that would be available under the 
approach described above) is generally considered an unreliable indicator of legislative 
preferences, as Eskridge himself has noted. In his 1988 article, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 
Eskridge discusses whether courts interpreting statutes should consider Congress’ failure to 
overrule a particular judicial interpretation as indicating that Congress approves of the 
interpretation. Eskridge states explicitly, “I believe that legislative inaction usually tells us very 
little about actual legislative intent,” and notes the many complexities of the legislative process 
that make interpretation of legislative inaction an often fruitless enterprise.242 First, Eskridge 
says, “it is very hard to aggregate preferences in such a large collection of people.”243 Second, 
because of the limited legislative agenda in Congress, “it is far more likely that something will 
not happen (inaction) than that it will (action),” due largely to inertia.244 Even where a bill has 
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substantial support, Eskridge notes, severe procedural roadblocks may be erected by opponents 
of the legislation.245
Again, these difficulties in interpreting legislative inaction argue in favor of Elhauge’s 
model, since under that approach, only affirmative action by Congress can provide a sufficient 
signal to permit dynamic statutory interpretation by the Court. But despite the problems with 
interpreting legislative action, I suggest that the general vigilance of Congress in reviewing 
Supreme Court interpretations provides a sufficient safeguard that legislative preferences will not 
be thwarted under the model I describe. Although Elhauge’s view provides some additional 
safeguard against judicial policymaking, the difference is not great, both because Congress 
generally does respond to Court opinions with which it strongly disagrees, as Eskridge 
demonstrates, and because either theory would provide significant room for judicial discretion. 
The critical importance of efficient advancement of the law in relation to scientific knowledge 
ultimately weighs in favor of Eskridge’s approach, at least in the technological arena. The 
Chakrabarty case itself provides an excellent example of the Supreme Court’s ability to
dynamically advance the law while showing sufficient respect to majoritarian demands. 
3.5: The Congressional Response to Chakrabarty
At least two clear stages characterized the congressional reaction to Chakrabarty – the 
initial lack of response between 1980 and 1987, and the later debates in the House and Senate 
following the Board’s decision in Ex Parte Allen in 1987. These stages are considered separately
below. 
3.4.1: 1980 to 1987: No Word from Congress
The lack of interest in the Chakrabarty decision evinced by Congress between 1980 and 
1987 is quite significant in light of Eskridge’s findings. In the period between the 96th and 100th 
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Congresses (1979-1988), Congress scrutinized a total of 262 Supreme Court statutory decisions, 
and overrode 62 such decisions.246 Eskridge did not calculate a precise ratio of scrutinized to 
unscrutinized Supreme Court decisions during this period, but he did find, for example, that 
between the 1977 and 1983 Supreme Court terms, the House and Senate Judiciary Committee s
scrutinized an average of 39 percent of all the Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation cases that 
were within their jurisdiction.247 Congress’ complete lack of response to Chakrabarty thus 
suggests that it “approved of,” or at least did not disagree with, the holding – that the Court in at 
least some sense enacted the legislature’s preferences into law. 
The objection that congressional inaction is difficult to interpret does not appear 
particularly significant in relation to the 1980-87 congressional reaction to Chakrabarty. The fact 
that Congress actively considered Chakrabarty after the 1987 Allen decision suggests that such 
an investigation could have occurred immediately following the holding had their been sufficient 
interest, and that Congress’ silence at the time indicated some level of acquiescence to the 
decision, rather than a procedural or interest-group-created roadblock. In addition, Eskridge’s 
description of how legislation can fall through procedural cracks seems to apply more strongly to 
cases in which the legislature considers an issue and then fails to follow through, as Congress did 
after 1987 – in that case, the procedural or political reasons for the failure could be manifold. 
Where Congress shows absolutely no interest in an issue, however, these explanations seem 
implausible, particularly in light of Eskridge’s convincing evidence that Congress regularly 
deliberated upon large numbers of Supreme Court decisions during the period of the 
Chakrabarty decision.
It is notable that while a long congressional silence followed the Chakrabarty decision, 
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Congress began to deliberate over the holding almost immediately following the In re Allen 
decision, which interpreted Chakrabarty to permit animal patenting. Perhaps this pattern 
indicates that Congress originally believed Chakrabarty did not apply to animals, and was
unconcerned by the holding for that reason. Under this understanding, Congress’ original 
passivity in the face of the Chakrabarty decision was due to a simple misunderstanding of the 
holding’s significance, and thus sheds little light on whether the decision was in any sense 
consistent with legislative preferences. To answer this question, it is necessary to consider the 
legislative activity that followed the Allen decision, when the expansiveness of the Chakrabarty 
holding had become quite clear. 
3.4.2: 1987 to the Present: A String of Failed Proposals
The significance of the multitude of failed congressional bills that followed Ex Parte 
Allen is difficult to determine, in part because of the problems with interpreting legislative 
inaction described above – many factors, including inertia and the high volume of material 
considered by Congress, may have lead to the failure of the bills. Several points are, however,
notable. 
First, the Court’s suggestion in Chakrabarty that the policy issues involved in the case 
should be considered by Congress rather than the Court, through the process of “balancing of 
competing values and interests, which in our democratic system is the business of elected 
representatives,”248  was arguably realized in the form of Representative Kastenmeier’s 1987
hearings in the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology. As described 
above, those hearings included statements by representatives of nearly every group with a stake 
in the issue, and the legal, ethical, scientific, political, and economic implications of the decision 
were all considered by the committee. In this sense, the Court appropriately relied on Congress
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to consider the policy issues in Chakrabarty. This is not an insignificant point. As Eskridge 
points out, congressional committees play a crucial role in gathering information, deliberating, 
and making recommendations to the larger legislative body.249 Most critically, Eskridge says, 
congressional committees “serve as devices to screen out the vast majority of policy proposals 
submitted to Congress.”250 Thus, where a congressional committee considers in depth a policy 
concern explicitly referred to it by the courts, it could be argued that a crucial step in the 
democratic process is functioning properly.
 Of course, such a process would not alleviate the countermajoritarian concerns related to 
aggressive Supreme Court statutory interpretations in certain cases. As Eskridge notes, on certain 
issues that are particularly controversial or on which powerful interest groups are evenly divided, 
Congress may be unable to act, leaving the Court’s interpretation intact due to political 
complications rather than actual legislative approval.251 Is Chakrabarty such a case? It is clear 
that certain interest groups were heavily involved in the issue. Nine organizations filed amicus 
briefs in Chakrabarty.252 Congressmen debating the issue on the House and Senate floors 
referred to lobbying activity several times, most significantly from biotechnology companies 
arguing against modification of the Chakrabarty holding (Senator Hatfield accused some biotech 
companies of “highly questionable tactics”253), but also from animal rights groups, farming 
groups, and others in favor of reform.254 Ananda Chakrabarty himself remembers that 
Chakrabarty “was greeted with joy and a sense of relief by the biotech industry and academic 
researchers [but] was viewed with disdain and frustration by many public interest and religious 
groups.”255 The issue has become even more polarized today, due to the added controversy over 
human cloning. There is thus certainly a possibility that congressional inaction on the issue has 
been due to an interest group-created impasse. 
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On the other hand, the presence of interest groups should not in itself imply that Congress 
was forced into an impasse on Chakrabarty. The evidence indicates that the interest group 
pressure on Congress as to Chakrabarty was not evenly divided (at least perhaps until the most 
recent cloning developments). Only two of the nine amicus curiae in the case argued in favor of 
the government,256 and the discussion of interest group pressure in Congress points to forceful 
lobbying by biotech companies in favor of the decision, but not to significant pressure from anti-
Chakrabarty groups. While the losing party in the case was formally the federal government 
(which, according to Eskridge, generally has significant success in persuading Congress to 
override a Supreme Court decision), there is no evidence that the federal government lobbied 
against the decision in Congress, and the real losing parties in the case were likely those 
presenting normative challenges to the decision, who probably did not have major lobbying 
capabilities.257 Thus, it seems unlikely, based on Eskridge’s data, that Congress’ inaction on 
Chakrabarty was due to an interest group impasse.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is almost impossible to definitively determine whether the Court’s decision 
in Chakrabarty was consistent with congressional preferences or not. When the legislature does 
not override the Court’s statutory interpretation, is it because the Court correctly gauged 
legislative preferences, or because those preferences were stymied in the legislature? It is often 
impossible to tell. But under the model described above – under which the Court interprets 
statutes dynamically, but is limited by an intention of avoiding Congressional override – no such 
determination is necessary. It is precisely this lesser need for legislative authorization that 
distinguishes Eskridge’s from Elhauge’s approach – while Elhauge demands written evidence 
that Congress itself would be willing to enact the Court’s interpretation into law, Eskridge is 
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satisfied with the guarantee that Congress will override an interpretation to which it is 
sufficiently opposed. Eskridge’s Court is a much more aggressive player in the “sequential 
game,” acting as an active partner to Congress.
Had the Supreme Court decided Chakrabarty differently, would Congress have amended 
§ 101 to allow the patenting of living organisms? Congress’ inaction in the face of Chakrabarty
suggests that it would have. Mr. Chakrabarty himself believes that Congress would have allowed 
patenting of living organisms, but not immediately: “Congress is not known to take quick action 
on anything that’s controversial …. Thus my hunch is that Congress would have taken 10 years 
to pass legislation on the patentability of life forms and only under intense pressure from the 
biotech lobby.” 258
If Chakrabarty is correct that Congress would have waited 10 years before permitting 
animal patenting, the Chakrabarty holding likely had critical importance in keeping up the pace
of advancements in genetic engineering in the United States. As the current debate on human 
cloning and patentability in Congress demonstrates, the impact of the Chakrabarty holding 
continues to be extraordinarily broad 25 years after the decision. Chakrabarty opened the door to 
innovations such as the Harvard mouse and other transgenic animals like it, which have provided 
extraordinary insight into human disease.  The decision has also encouraged production of the 
many varieties of patented transgenic plants that are pest-resistant, nutrient-rich, and might 
someday ameliorate malnutrition in third-world countries.
Of course, it is impossible to know precisely what Congress would have done in the 
absence of Chakrabarty – this is the dilemma with which Eskridge’s approach leaves us . But in 
the area of patent law, where the rapid pace of technological progress suggests both that 
Congress cannot amend statutes at a sufficiently fast rate and that legal delays can cause severe 
54
consequences to scientific progress, this is a cost that brings with it many benefits. There is no
sign that the pace of scientific innovation is slowing, and the Court can and should have the same 
impact on other areas of technology that it has had on the progress of genetic engineering.259
Congress is an inherently slow institution, and as science and technology evolve at an 
increasingly rapid rate and patent law continues to play a central role in encouraging further 
innovation, the Court must be empowered to update patent doctrine through the aggressive 
interpretation of statutes.
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